Ideology Takes a Day Off: Althusser and Mass Culture by Rhodes, Chip
Studies in 20th Century Literature 
Volume 18 




Ideology Takes a Day Off: Althusser and Mass Culture 
Chip Rhodes 
SUNY at Stony Brook 
Follow this and additional works at: https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl 
 Part of the Film and Media Studies Commons, and the French and Francophone Literature Commons 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative 
Works 4.0 License. 
Recommended Citation 
Rhodes, Chip (1994) "Ideology Takes a Day Off: Althusser and Mass Culture," Studies in 20th Century 
Literature: Vol. 18: Iss. 1, Article 5. https://doi.org/10.4148/2334-4415.1337 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by New Prairie Press. It has been accepted for inclusion in 
Studies in 20th Century Literature by an authorized administrator of New Prairie Press. For more information, 
please contact cads@k-state.edu. 
Ideology Takes a Day Off: Althusser and Mass Culture 
Abstract 
As theories of mass culture that focus on empowerment, use value and utopian bribes have become 
increasingly popular, Althusser's groundbreaking work on structural causality and ideology has been left 
aside because of its alleged inability to account for social resistance. This is unfortunate because such 
Althusserian concepts still provide the most productive foundation for a Marxist approach to mass 
culture that avoids both unwitting apologetics and facile, ethical critiques. Nevertheless, many of 
Althusser's theoretical claims are in need of revision. As the film Ferris Bueller's Day Off implicitly 
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oriented capitalism. In addition, the film undermines Althusser's assertion that the schools are the most 
powerful ISA under capitalism, suggesting instead that mass culture now fulfills this function under late 
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Ideology Takes A Day Off: Althusser and Mass Culture 
Chip Rhodes 
SUNY at Stony Brook 
Ideology, then, is the expression of the 
relation among men and their 'world,' that 
is the (overdetermined) unity of the real 
relation and the imaginary relation between 
them and their real conditions of existence. 
-"Marxism and Humanism" 
In the move within cultural studies toward the effacement of the 
distinction between high and low culture, the Althusserian theory of 
ideology has become something that one moves beyond. In this theory's 
implications many critics have detected the creeping specter of the 
culture industry's conception of popular texts, with its supposed vision 
of the masses as lambs led unwittingly to the slaughter. In its place, a 
variety of modes of " reading the popular" (in John Fiske' s phrase) have 
gained popularity that focus on empowerment, use value, and utopian 
bribes and seek to bring what Fredric Jameson calls "dialectical 
criticism" into the study of mass culture. 
It will be the argument of this paper that these two recognizable 
poles of cultural criticism-the conspiracy theories of massive 
interpellation of an essentially docile public, and the populist theories 
of a more savvy public that picks and chooses according to its needs and 
desires-represent a false choice between structuralism without agency 
and humanism with. In this reduction, Althusser's groundbreaking 
work on ideology, structural causality, relative autonomy and 
overdetermination is either ignored or misconstrued. Using these 
conceptual tools, this essay will attempt the following: first, to articu- 
late an Althusserian approach to mass culture that draws on both 
Althusser's work on ideology and his less influential work on the 
aesthetic; second, to update much of what Althusser says specifically 
about the contours of ideology under capitalism, focusing in particular 
on the rise of mass culture. 
I will begin with a discussion of a standard critique of Althusser and 
then move on to those alternative models that focus largely on struggle 
at the level of consumption. Then I will discuss a popular film (Ferris 
Bueller's Day 00 at length because it points in the direction that an 1
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elaboration of Althusser's work must go in order to deal with the 
increasingly dominant role played by mass culture within the ISAs as 
a whole. More concretely, I hope to use the film to show how mass 
culture's widespread success in producing consumer desire in contem- 
porary America requires a revamped Althusserian theory of ideological 
interpellation that includes the aesthetic. This project, again, need not 
import concepts from outside Althusserian Marxism. It is quite consis- 
tent with Althusser's model of ideology in general, even if it takes issue 
with some of its particulars. The ultimate goal is to produce knowledge 
about what he calls in Reading Capital the "mechanism of production 
of the society effect in the capitalist mode of production" (66). 
* * * 
Criticisms of Althusser are not hard to find. They have come from 
post-structuralists and orthodox Marxists alike. Perry Anderson, who 
used Althusserian tools himself in Lineages of the Absolutist State, 
explains the ill-fated union of structuralism and Marxism this way: 
"Rather than resisting this move [the structuralist rejection of the 
humanist subject], Althusser radicalized it, with a version of Marxism 
in which subjects were abolished altogether, save as the illusory effects 
of ideological structures" (Tracks 38). Anderson's point is simple. The 
union was a mistake for Marxism from the start because its displace- 
ment of the constituting subject from the historical process necessarily 
precludes collective political action toward revolutionary change. In 
terms of the study of mass culture, the point is equally straightforward. 
The decentering of the subject denigrates the individual, turning her/ 
him into little more than the "illusory effects of ideological structures," 
passive repositories without any capacity for resistance. 
The either/or logic underpinning this now familiar critique of 
Althusser runs roughly as follows: either there are no constituting 
subjects, individual or collective, and we may as well let history and the 
class struggle take their course, or there are real possibilities of 
conscious intervention through organised political action. If the argu- 
ment is formulated in this way (as it usually is by Marxist Humanists), 
then political action and its agents must be privileged. The fear of the 
loss of the subject (individual or collective) as the constituting historical 
agent is thus the underlying issue we must bear in mind in trying to make 
sense of the polarized debate over mass culture mentioned above. This 
fear is also largely responsible, I think, for the shift in emphasis from 
production to consumption. As Meaghan Morris has argued, the 
"banality" of culture studies today is its view of consumption as a 2




separate sphere "rather than [as] one of the necessary, complex, 
variable phases of a productive process" (21). Morris attributes this 
development to the facility with which struggle can be found in 
consumption and the difficulty finding it in an increasingly compli- 
cated, deindustrialized global economy. 
Warren Montag has argued in a similar vein that Jameson's 
conception of postmodernism denies the possibility for struggle at the 
level of production.' Jameson's approach to mass culture seems to 
follow logically from this dispiriting conclusion. Indeed, because 
conflict can no longer be found in production proper, Jameson seeks and 
finds it elsewhere in the subject's interaction with popular texts. 
However, both the denial of production and the affirmation of consump- 
tion can be traced to the same source. Both derive from a single theory 
of history. For Jameson, history is a totalization with a totalizer, a 
developmental narrative by which men caught in the realm of necessity 
yearn for the realm of freedom. In other words, history is a process with 
a subject-an idealist theory Althusser attributes to Hegel. 
It should be pointed out up front that Jameson's approach to the 
popular and Althusser's are not diametically opposed. Both agree that 
the practice of popular culture is not a univocal, but a contradictory one. 
The difference between these two theories lies in the complexion and 
complexity of this contradiction. Consider the logic underpinning this 
passage from Jameson's essay, "Reification and Utopia in Mass 
Culture": 
[T]he hypothesis is that the works of mass culture cannot be 
ideological without at one and the same time being implicitly or 
explicitly Utopian as well: they cannot manipulate unless they 
offer some genuine shred of content as a fantasy bribe to the public 
about to be so manipulated . . . the deepest and most fundamental 
hopes and fantasies of the collectivity. (30) 
History, in this passage, is something of an unnatural ruse that thwarts 
and manipulates a collectivity that has sought throughout the course of 
time to realize its deepest desires, the purest pre-social expressions of 
human nature. Popular texts then articulate the repressed desires of the 
people, the real subjects of history. The public is consequently drawn 
to those popular texts that narrate its collective story. 
However much sympathy we may feel for this as an ideology, it is 
just that: an ideology, and not an explanation of the structural practices 
that determine its shape and function. In its refusal to abandon the 
humanist subject, Jameson's formulation sacrifices its potential to 3
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make sense of the conflicts within the structures that determine that very 
subject. As Michel Pecheux has indicated, there exist "relations of 
contradiction-uneveness- subordination" among and within these struc- 
tures that can and often do produce resistance (143-54). But Jameson's 
subject-based discourse does not make the epistemological break that 
Althusser attributes to the later Marx, a break that allows for an 
understanding of history as a process without a subject. 
An Althusserian approach to popular texts necessarily conceives of 
such texts as overdetermined. Texts, like subjects, are the product of 
intersecting (and conflicting) material practices. Instead of focusing on 
a utopian dimension as a bribe to a pre-existing subject, a strict 
Althusserian approach should conceive of texts and subjects both as the 
bearers of structures. Both are sites of a complex interplay among multi- 
leveled material practices that includes but is not reducible to economic 
practice. To operationalize this approach to the text, Althusser recom- 
mends what he calls symptomatic reading. This method decisively 
rejects Jameson's humanist ideology that affirms the existence of a 
subject that can be distinguished from its social context in favor of a 
discourse that reads the text for "specific structures of historicity" that 
are immanent in the text in their effect (RC 108).2 
Terry Lovell has argued that such anti-humanist knowledge is 
ultimately disabling to political action because it sees the subject as 
constituted by ideology and not constitutive of history (241-46). Indeed, 
this too is a familiar criticism, and it is one that Althusser himself 
acknowledged in his later essays.' It is true that Althusser did not fully 
formulate an account of how the working class might make history. But 
as Althusserians like Pecheux, Goran Therborn and Catherine Belsey 
have shown, Althusser's work on ideology can provide the basis for a 
cultural politics that does.' Pecheux' work is particularly valuable for 
our purposes because it stresses the absolute necessity of hard empirical 
work to determine the balance of class forces and the structural features 
of capitalist society at any given historical moment. Only after this work 
has been done can the progressive or reactionary charge of any given 
popular artifact be determined. 
When Althusser writes in "On the Materialist Dialectic" that 
contradiction is the motive force of history, he is suggesting (as any 
Marxist should) that each of the multiple contradictions that exists in 
the complex whole in dominance means "a real struggle, real confron- 
tations, precisely located within the structure of the complex whole" 
(FM 215). Theories of mass culture like Jameson's and Lovell's imply 
that this motive force derives from the subject (instead of constituting 
it) because individuals will always and instinctively fight against 4




exploitation. As a result, however, the specificity of any given conjunc- 
ture gets lost in the rush to treat the culture industry dialectically. The 
cultural critic finds this essential conflict time and again, and history 
becomes a continuous narrative produced by human intentionality. The 
Althusserian subject does indeed 'make history' too, but always in ways 
that exceed its intent. Montag puts it this way: 
We act within a specific conjuncture only to see that conjuncture 
transformed beneath our feet, perhaps by our intervention itself, 
but always in ways that ultimately escape our intention or control, 
thereby requiring new interventions ad infinitum. (PD 102) 
This need for on-going intervention presupposes a resisting subject, but 
not a humanist one. Moreover, it implies that the ideologically consti- 
tuted subject is decentered because ideology is structured like language, 
a point that Michael Sprinker has made.' This is why ideology is eternal 
and why the subject is constantly being hailed, constantly being 
interpellated by the ISAs. This is also why the subject is overdetermined, 
in process and thus always susceptible to interpellation by competing 
ideologies like communism.6 
Consequently, any investigation of mass culture must carefully 
situate it in relation to other ideological practices-ones like the family 
and the schools that have traditionally played a more crucial role in 
fulfilling ideology's function. The relations among these practices is 
not predetermined, but rather always shifting--and always possessing 
the potential for a reshuffling that operates to transform the productive 
relations. The fact that these relations cannot be known a priori is 
implicit in the ISA essay. In it, Althusser says that under capitalism the 
schools have replaced the church as the dominant apparatus. However, 
as we will see in a moment when we turn to Ferris Bueller, the schools 
no longer hold this privileged position, having relinquished it to mass 
culture. 
Lovell and John Fiske find elitism in Marxist approaches to the 
popular that do not grant consumers the ability to decide for them- 
selves.' They point out that the consumer still determines whether a 
high-budget Hollywood film, for example, will be a blockbuster or a 
bust. Lovell turns to Marx's concept of use value to theorize the 
individual's ability to use the commodities foisted upon him or her for 
contrary purposes. In buying, in other words, the subject resists. In 
choosing to watch a particular television show or attend a particular 
film, the subject is asserting its ability to fight back against its 
oppressors. And yet, however much we may wish to stress the subver- 5
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sive potential of popular texts, we don't want to forget the overall social 
effect of mass culture. Although we may indeed struggle politically at 
the level of consumption, we are continually reminded that this struggle 
is not waged on a level playing field. In general, mass culture displaces 
antagonism far more often than it condenses or instigates it. Here surely 
Althusser's notion of "last instance determination" is a helpful (if 
sobering) reminder that these texts are commodities delimited by the 
economic interests that finance them and reap the profits. Theories of 
culture that dwell on empowerment and resistance too often read like 
apologies for the culture industry. The point isn't that no struggle goes 
on at this level, but that this struggle is only relatively autonomous. As 
such, it must always be studied as one among many phases of a 
complicated production process. 
In a moment, I will concretize this investigation by turning to 
Ferris Bueller's Day Of a film that can be read as a critical allegory 
of Althusser's theory of ideology. More specifically, it takes as its 
subject matter the complex role of mass culture in subject interpellation. 
Our discussion of the particular function of mass culture must acknowl- 
edge that this apparatus was not sufficiently theorized by Althusser. 
While it is true that other apparatuses generally seek to construct 
producing subjects prepared to enter the work force without complaint, 
mass culture is tied so heavily to consumption that the subjects it seeks 
to construct are more consuming subjects characterized by classlessness. 
Here, it might be argued that in his broader assertions concerning 
ideology Althusser did not always adhere to his own caution to respect 
the relative autonomy of different material practices. While the cumu- 
lative effect of ideology as Althusser saw it in the ISAs essay was a 
"free" producing subject, a mass culture-dominated ideological ma- 
trix seems to form something very different: a nonproductive, "free" 
consuming subject. True, these two subjects are both first and foremost 
"misrecognizing" subjects, seeing themselves as their own cause-a 
process Pecheux calls the "Miinchhausen" effect after the immortal 
baron who lifted himself into the air by pulling his own hair (103-09). 
Moreover, it can be argued that the producing and consuming subjects 
are complementary. In order to acquire the consumer items that will 
express one's unique individuality, one must enter the work force to 
make the necessary capital. But if mass culture's ascendance comes at 
the expense of the schools' legitimacy (as indeed it does in Ferris 
Bueller) then an ideological crisis might be in the offing. If education 
is the ideological practice that teaches the skills needed to participate 
in the labor force, its denigration by mass culture jeopardizes ideology's 
overarching function. 6




Althusser did not provide for the radical alteration of the ideologi- 
cal terrain that mass culture's ascendance in the United States has 
brought about. I've already mentioned its denigration of the educational 
apparatus and complication of the production side of capitalism. But it 
has also swallowed up the aesthetic. Although Althusser always 
included the aesthetic among the ISAs, he saw it as a sort of second- 
order signifying system that "internally distantiates" ideology and 
allows the spectator/reader to "see, perceive and feel" the discrepancy 
between the imaginary relation of ideology and the real relation of the 
productive relations.8 This theory has been criticized often enough for 
its ostensible privileging of the avant-garde and its dismissal of classical 
realism.9 I will not rehash this argument. I only wish to suggest that it 
is no longer a particularly relevant one because mass culture itself has 
erased the dividing line between the two aesthetic modes. Ferris 
Bueller's Day Offconfronts the Althusserian aesthetic with a mocking 
dilemma: it is a cynical, enormously popular film that appears to lay its 
own practice bare. It thus renders the Althusserian division between 
"real" art and mass culture meaningless. But it also points the way 
toward a revised Althusserian approach to cultural artifacts that is 
capable of making sense of mass culture in the postmodern age. 
* * * 
The choice of Ferris Bueller's Day Off is not an arbitrary one. The 
film speaks volumes about teen films in particular and mass culture in 
general because it takes as its very subject the ideological function of 
such discourses. It presents us with a literalization of the interpellative 
process that Althusser outlines in the ISA essay. Ferris Bueller-the 
consummate teenage trickster figure-doesn't merely outwit school 
administrators and parents; he also teaches his best friend Cameron and 
the audience how to be individuals in a capitalist society. His day of fun 
and frolic in Chicago is only a pretense to pass along this valuable 
lesson. Ferris is something of a filmic figure for the Absolute Subject 
in whose name individuals are interpellated as subjects by ideology. 
Cameron is a filmic figure for the "hailed" subject that only exists in 
and through ideology. To pursue this schematic outline, the relationship 
between Ferris and Cameron allegorizes two processes: first, 
transhistorically how what Althusser calls ideology in general func- 
tions, has always functioned, and always will function-even after 
class distinctions have been erased. Consequently, the self-originating 
subject of humanism is the determinate absence of the film. It is 
revealed instead to be the bearer of structures; and second, historically 7
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how the relations of contradiction-unevenness-subordination among 
the ideological apparatuses that serve to shape individuals as subjects 
have shifted. In the realigned relations that can be read symptomatically 
from the film, the schools (the apparatus Althusser argued was the 
dominant apparatus in capitalist society) and the family are subordinate 
to and in contradiction with the mass culture apparatus that has become 
increasingly hegemonic. This is particularly true in youth culture, the 
segment of the population that has yet to take up its position within the 
productive relations. This shift in the complex constellation of ideologi- 
cal practices parallels a shift in a subject defined by its identity as a 
producer to a subject defined as a consumer-a shift from a free wage 
laborer to a consumer expressing his/her freedom in the marketplace of 
leisure. This shift also suggests that the ISAs function in late capitalism 
no longer to fulfill ideology's role of reproducing the productive 
relations in the way Althusser envisioned when he wrote the ISA essay. 
From the opening shot, the spectator is positioned as a sort of silent 
pupil quite explicitly by Ferris, who has just conned his parents into 
believing that he is too sick to go to school. As the door of Ferris' 
bedroom shuts behind them, Ferris turns directly to the camera (thus 
breaking the fourth wall so precious to classic realism) and says, "They 
bought it. The worst performance of my life and they never doubted it 
for a second." There is nothing shocking about this rupture of the 
diegetic space, however. No alienation effect is produced. Through a 
combination of exaggerated point of view shots from Ferris' perspec- 
tive and aided by his unctuous overacting, the spectator is led to 
recognize that what she/he is witnessing is purely performative. 
In the series of tableaux that follow, Ferris gives the camera a 
primer on how to bring off a similar deception. As we tag along, Ferris 
takes a shower during which he offers up what is supposed to be the 
film's message. Here, as elswhere, director John Hughes gives his 
audience little credit, presenting this thematization as the filmic 
equivalent of the Cliff Notes they no doubt read instead of the books 
themselves: 
I do have a test today. That wasn't bullshit. It's on European 
Socialism. I mean, really, what's the point? I'm not European. I 
don't plan on being European, so who gives a crap if they're 
Socialists? They could be fascist anarchists for all I care and it still 
wouldn't change the fact that I don't have a car. Not that I condone 
fascism. Or any ism for that matter. Isms, in my opinion, are not 
good. A person should not believe in an ism, he should believe in 8




himself I quote John Lennon: "I don't believe in Beatles, I just 
believe in me." 
Ferris seems to be saying that ideologies are not just uniformally bad, 
they're irrelevant. The subject who "believes in himself" is outside of 
the apparatus through which ideology realizes itself. Schools (in 
addition to the family, which is also not to be taken seriously judging 
by the ease with which Ferris outsmarts his parents) here stand as the 
pre-eminent purveyors of the kind of "ism" Ferris deplores. Inter- 
spersed with this lesson on how to resist the dominant ideological 
apparatus, the viewer is treated to a series of shots from classrooms. The 
contrast is clear. While Ferris moves around the house freely, dancing 
to themes from MTV and "Bewitched" and then sipping a tropical 
drink by the family pool, his peers are staring glassy-eyed at unspeak- 
ably boring teachers droning on about the Great Depression and 
symbolism in some unspecified novel. 
This segment erects the fundamental distinction upon which the 
film's ideological project depends: the distinction between the subject 
and the social structure that demands allegiance-between two spaces, 
the ideological and the nonideological. According to Ferris and the 
film, there are subjects who exist within ideology (like those who 
submit to school authority and take the test on European Socialism), and 
those who elude its grasp by believing in themselves. The spectator ends 
up in the interesting position, soon to taken up by Cameron within the 
film, of a student being taught how to be herself or himself. But as 
Althusser argues, such a distinction is the precondition for the practice 
of ideology. "What really takes place in ideology seems to take place 
outside it. That is why those who are in ideology believe themselves by 
definition outside ideology: ideology never says, 'I am ideological' " 
(LP 175). So far, the film is keeping to Althusser's model of ideology 
in general. But we should recognize that Ferris' modes of expressing 
this vaguely articulated belief in oneself are (and will be throughout the 
film) all mass cultural, consumer-oriented activities. While the ideo- 
logical work done in the formerly dominant schools is clearly at odds 
with the reality of the existence of its subjects, mass culture presents the 
"nonideological" liberation of leisure and consumption. Ferris chooses 
all these activities. Conversely, the apathy on the students' faces in the 
schools bespeaks the consequence of their refusal to exercise individual 
choice. A change in the dominant apparatus is figured here that in turn 
constructs a different subject. It is no longer a willing worker, but a 
consumer in the democratic marketplace. Of course, this is an imagi- 
nary relation inasmuch as it denies the reality of unequal distribution of 9
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the capital necessary to express this individuality. Thus the shift from 
a producer-oriented ideological matrix to a nonproductive, consumer 
culture also seeks fictively to deny the reality of class (which emanates 
from the productive relations). 
One point on ideology in general: the seductiveness of Ferris' 
monologue clearly is suggestive in some unexpected ways. If we accept 
Althusser's contention that there will always be ideology and thus 
subjects, then Ferris' manner of presentation could be used in very 
different ways. If, instead of reciting an ode to consumption, Ferris were 
to begin inculcating the beliefs of historical materialism and explaining 
the social construction of identity, might the film serve a more radical 
political aim? If, as Slajov Zizek has argued, you don't believe in 
communism because you understand Marx, but rather you understand 
Marx because you believe in communism, then might Ferris' example 
suggest an initial procedure for bringing subjects to internalize an 
ideological system? Of course, the film probably would not have been 
produced (let alone have been successful) if its ideological raw material 
hadn't been familiar and safe. The next crucial allegorical section of the 
film involves the introduction of Cameron, Ferris' best friend, who 
really is too sick to go to school. When we meet Cameron for the first 
time, he is lying motionless in bed, covered from head to toe by blankets. 
The phone rings and Cameron's voice is heard from under the bed 
covers moaning monotonously. We then hear Ferris' voice speaking 
through the answering machine, telling Cameron to pick up the receiver 
because Ferris knows he's there. It is only after several moments that 
Cameron picks up the phone, and even then the camera cannot make out 
his face beneath the blankets. All we can hear is Cameron's voice 
chanting, "Let my Cameron go," over and over. Read allegorically, 
this scene is a temporalization of the process of entry into subjectivity 
Althusser describes. Only when Ferris hails him does Cameron recog- 
nize that it is really he, Cameron, who is the subject of Ferris' hailing; 
only then does he accept his social existence. 
Ferris's motives are two-fold. On the one hand, he claims to be 
rescuing Cameron from the malaise that has resulted from the contra- 
dictory effects of interpellation in the family and the schools. In both 
the family and the schools, the degraded position of subordination 
Cameron inhabits has produced alienation and cynicism. However, 
Cameron's apathy can also be read as the result of a disjunction between 
an ideology of a productive subject appropriate to an early phase of 
capitalism and the reality of a nonproductive, commodity-oriented 
economy. The latter is represented by the only employment options the 
film presents: real estate agent and advertising executive (held by 10




Ferris' mother and father respectively). Both jobs are lucrative, but 
neither produces any value. This gap thus suggests the unevenness of 
the relations among ideological apparatuses. The schools and the 
family have lagged behind a shift in the U.S. economy that has thrown 
the fictiveness of ideology into relief and diminishes its effectiveness. 
Ferris is an agent of the now dominant ideology of free consumption 
more appropriate to this new phase. On the other hand, we must 
remember that Ferris has a particular reason for calling Cameron: he 
needs him, needs his car to turn his plan of a "day off" into a reality. 
Similarly, the ideology of consumption that mass culture legitimizes 
needs the capital that a constructed, desiring consumer will spend to 
perpetuate itself. 
The structures that determine the subject thus become the very 
subject matter ofFerris Iler. In the action that follows Ferris' phone 
call to Cameron, we see Cameron trying to decide whether or not to give 
in to Ferris' demand that he pick him up in his car. But much of the 
humor of this segment derives from the fact that Ferris and the camera 
guess--always correctly--what Cameron is thinking to himself. At 
one point, just as Cameron is about to drive to Ferris' house, he abruptly 
turns the car off, gets out and disappears back into the house. As the 
viewer watches Cameron through the back window storming away, the 
camera never leaves the car seat Cameron has abandoned. It waits 
patiently for Cameron to return and go get Ferris. Like Ferris, the 
camera knows what Cameron does not. What appears to be an internal 
dilemma that Cameron as an autonomous subject must resolve is 
determined by the ideological structure that dominates him. Evidence 
supporting this conclusion will accumulate through the course of the 
film until, at the very end, it serves to undermine Cameron's declara- 
tions of self-determination. Thus, while the viewer does indeed come 
to identify with Cameron, this identification includes the fact that 
human nature is the end product of a process of internalization, not the 
source of meaning. In this sense, the film clearly illustrates Pierre 
Macherey's thesis that the work of art does not so much express 
ideology as it endows it with aesthetic figuration that ends up enacting 
the latter's unmasking and self-criticism.'° Thus, a film that offers a 
developmental narrative of a character coming to terms with himself 
unmasks the very process that makes this mystification possible. 
After Ferris bullies Cameron into letting him "borrow" Cameron's 
father's limited edition 1961 Ferrari to pick up Ferris' girlfriend Sloane 
from school, the three head into Chicago for the day. After parking the 
car in a garage, they go to an upscale restaurant at which Ferris 
impersonates Abe Froman, the sausage king of Chicago. Then they go 11
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to a Cubs game, to the Art Institute and finally to a parade. What is worth 
noting about these scenes is that each takes place in an ideological space 
that is in no way innocent of the charge levelled explicitly at the schools 
and implicitly at the family. The presention of the school scenes and 
Cameron's description of his home life have figured ideology as a 
repressive force. At the school, boring teachers who pass on stale 
ideology share space with vindictive administrators like Principal Ed 
Rooney whose sole purpose appears punitive. At home, parents are 
either domineering like Cameron's commmodity-fetishizing father (he 
"loves this car more than life itself," says Cameron) and children are 
subordinate and fearful or parents are eminently gullible like Ferris' 
loving, cliché-spewing parents, and children get away with murder. In 
neither case is there any room for "free" expression and autonomy. The 
"day off " is the antidote to the alienation that characterizes the schools 
and the family. But the antidote costs money (especially the restaurant 
where Ferris even feels the need to slip some money to the snotty maitre 
d'), and the process whereby money is made and distributed unequally 
falls outside the film's purview. 
When Cameron finally appears to be letting go and actually 
enjoying himsel fin the way Ferris encourages, he stops worrying for the 
first time about the condition of his father's favorite fetishized com- 
modity, the Ferrari. The car is literally that and figuratively a conden- 
sation point for the contradictions that traverse Cameron's subjectivity. 
As they are driving home, Cameron notices that the odometer reads over 
100 miles higher than it should. The odometer presents inescapable 
proof of the principal contradiction that has run through the film--the 
incompatibility of the actions Ferris compels Cameron to undertake as 
a free subject and the actions expected of Cameron as a dutiful son by 
his father. Put another way, the odometer registers the contradiction 
between the imaginary relation to existence that represses class differ- 
ences and the real relation to existence that is based upon a class-based 
power discrepancy. Ferris represents the former imaginary relation; the 
father as "absent cause" is the source of the latter real one." When this 
contradiction disrupts the forward movement of the narrative, Cameron's 
(and the viewer's) interpellation is also disrupted. As a result, Cameron 
lets out a blood-curdling scream, which is sustained as the camera 
disappears down his open throat. When it re-emerges, Cameron is 
catatonic. For the moment, the contradiction that traverses the ideologi- 
cal apparatus of the social formation has made acting as a "free" 
subject impossible. 
It seems fair to read this moment as an aporia of sorts. Read on its 
own terms, the film depicts Cameron's process of coming to understand 12




and accept his status as a subject who "works by himself," in Althusser's 
words. But the film also generates a second reading that suggests that 
contradiction is a condition of narrative, a condition of ideology. It is the 
antagonistic relation between these two readings that leads to Cameron's 
momentary paralysis. From this point on, the film works to recuperate 
this rupture. And so, the problem of Cameron's subject formation is 
transformed into one of abstract, psychologized fear. Cameron thus 
decides to take the heat for the car debacle, despite Ferris' rather 
lackluster protests. When Cameron claims that he is responsible for his 
own actions and Ferris smiles, Cameron says, "it is possible to say no 
to Ferris Bueller, you know." This statement is a reiteration with a 
difference of Ferris' earlier claim that it is possible for the individual to 
get outside ideology in leisure activity and consumerism. Only now the 
invalidity of such a claim is evident. The statement is a false reconcili- 
ation of the contradiction that surfaced when Cameron saw the odom- 
eter. 
Later, when the film proper is over and the credits have rolled, 
Ferris returns to the screen and tells the audience with feigned irritation 
that the film is over. "Go on, go home, it's over," he says with a 
dismissive wave. This suggests that the consumer subject thus consti- 
tuted through mass culture is a desiring subject based on lack. It suggests 
that as long as mass culture reigns supreme among the ISAs, the subject 
will indeed act in the contradictory fashion of Cameron-denying her/ 
his subordination in the productive relations and proving her/his 
freedom by spending money on leisure pursuits and films like Ferris 
Bueller. 
The film in general and the last tableau in particular testify to 
Hughes' cynicism. Self-reflexivity, now a stock postmodern technique, 
increases the film's own smirky appeal. It also renders inescapable the 
erasure of Althusser's distinction between the aesthetic and plain 
ideology. Ferris Bueller produces no alienation effect. Nor does it 
distantiate the film's own ideology. Rather, it takes consumerism as a 
given and assumes an audience raised on television and Hollywood. 
Hughes reinforces this ideology by figuring it as nonideological and 
contrasting it to the now outmoded school and family that offer 
obviously subordinate subject positions. 
The implication for further work in the Althusserian tradition 
should now be evident. We need to start with a theory of ideology that 
exists only in and through subjects, but we must be continually aware 13
Rhodes: Ideology Takes a Day Off: Althusser and Mass Culture
Published by New Prairie Press
52 STCL, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Winter, 1994) 
of the fact that the configuration of the ISAs is dynamic. While ideology 
in general is eternal, ideologies are always changing. Moreover, we 
should resist the trendy temptation to consider postmodernism as "the 
end of all crises, the end of all narratives, the end of resistance and 
revolutionary transformation," in Montag's words (102). The effect of 
any ideological practice on the spectator cannot be known ahead of 
time. It will vary according to the different overdetermined and 
contradictory, constructions of different audiences. Ferris Bueller will 
be most likely to contradict the imaginary and real relations of audience 
members who don't happen to be white, male and middle-class 
suburbanites-a contradiction that might potentially lead to spectator 
resistance to Ferris' "call." But the possibilities for resistance that any 
cultural artifact might elicit can't be determined solely with the help of 
theory. They can only be determined through the kind of empirical work 
necessary to comprehend the text's historical specificity. Althusser 
provides us with some of the tools for such work, but these alone will 
not determine what we may find. 
Any text of mass culture like Ferris Bueller will necessarily bear 
the marks of contradiction and conflict that traverse the historical 
moment of its production even if it ends in mystification. These marks 
are not, however, the unavoidable result of the arbitariness of language 
or the impossibility of achieving semantic closure. They are the mark 
of the history of multiple social struggles. Consumption marks one such 
social struggle, but only one. To focus exclusively on consumption 
obscures as much as it illuminates. The prominence of consumption in 
my reading of Ferris Bueller does not contradict this assertion. Con- 
sumption is the effect of ideological production, not the antidote. It is 
an ideology with a history (specifically, emerging at the turn of the 
century to meet increased industrial production). Shaped by the specific 
modality of filmic form, the consumer ideal of individuality that Ferris 
embodies narrates its own unmasking in Cameron's imminent punish- 
ment at the hands of his father (which is not shown, of course) and the 
underlying reality that he will have to get a job someday. The ideology 
of uninhibited consumerism is thus contradicted most fundamentally by 
the necessity of employment to make the money necessary to exercise 
it. It is a banal fact for much of the population, however, that even 
employment does not lead to free-wheeling spending. More often than 
not, it brings simple subsistence. 
This is the primary contradiction in the film. But it is overdetermined 
by an educational system that seeks to establish the predispositions 
appropriate to the division of labor of the economic system and a 
domestic sphere that is built upon a "natural" and "legitimate" power 14




disparity between adults and teenagers. From an Althusserian perspec- 
tive, Ferris Bueller's Day Off is a cultural artifact that allows for the 
provisional construction of a model of its society. Such an approach to 
mass culture rejects belief in either the pure hegemony of the ruling 
classes or the heroic resistance of exploited men and women who 
"make their own history." For the key to this famous quotation from 
The 18th Brumaire lies in the next few words: "but they do not make 
it just as they please" (15). The dialectic between acquiesence and 
resistance that characterizes mass culture in particular and the ISAs in 
general is the Marxist dialectic of history. This dialectic is driven 
forward continually by conflict and contradiction. In a Marxist theory 
of history, it could not be otherwise. 
Notes 
1. Montag, "What is at Stake in the Debate on Postmodernism?" Postmodernism 
and Its Discontents, ed. E. Ann Kaplan (London: Verso, 1988). 
2. This paragraph's brief explication of what an Althusserian approach to 
popular texts entails is indebted to numerous Althusserians. Catherine Belsey's 
Critical Practice (London: Methuen, 1980) remains one of the more accessible 
explications of this theory. 
3. Althusser, Essays In Self-Criticism, trans. Grahame Lock (London: New 
Left Books, 1976). In these essays, Althusser fmds himself guilty of excessive 
theoreticism in his early, influential writings. 
4. See Pecheux's Language, Semantics and Ideology, trans. Harbans Nagpal 
(New York: St. Martin's, 1982), Belsey's Critical Practice, and Therborn's 
The Ideology of Power and the Power of Ideology (London: Verso, 1980), all 
of which seek to clarify the role of social struggle in Althusserian Marxism. 
5. See Chapter Nine of Imaginary Relations (London: Verso, 1987) that 
pursues parallels between Althusser's theory of ideology and Paul de Man's 
theory of language. 
6. Rosalind Coward and John Ellis make just this point in Language and 
Materialism (London: Routledge, 1977). 
7. Lovell makes this point in "The Social Relations of Cultural Production: 
Absent Centre of a New Discourse" One-Dimensional Marxism (London: 
Allison, 1980) and Fiske makes it in his Reading the Popular (Boston: Unwin, 
1989). 
8. See Althusser's three essays on art: "The 'Piccolo Teatro': Bertolazzi and 
Brecht," For Marx, trans. Ben Brewster (London and New York: Verso Press, 
1969); "A Letter on Art in Reply to Andre Daspre" and "Cremonini, Painter 15
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of the Abstract," Lenin and Philosophy, trans. Ben Brewster (New York: 
Monthly Review P, 1970). 
9. This criticism has been levelled often enough. See Tony Bennett's Formal- 
ism and Marxism (London and New York: Rout ledge, 1979) and Outside 
Literature (London and New York: Rout ledge, 1990) or any of the essays from 
One-Dimensional Marxism for a sampling. 
10. Macherey, A Theory of Literary Production, trans. Geoffrey Wall (London: 
Routledge, 1978). 
11. The distinction between "imaginary" and "real" in Althusser's formu- 
lation has been criticized from many corners. Although I don't wish to go into 
it here, I would only say that "real" merely suggests what Lovell, Jameson and 
many others do not contest: namely, that the subject has a position within the 
social structure that can be identified using the conceptual tools of Marxism. 
In my view, if one gives up on the project of situating subjects within a class 
structure, however overdetermined that structure may be, one gives up on the 
project of a Marxist science of history. For a representative account of the 
critique ofthese distinctions-real/imaginary, science/ideology-see Bennett's 
books cited above. 
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